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ADVERTISING, TASTE
CONSTRUCTION, AND THE
SEARCH FOR ENLIGHTENED
POLICY: A CRITIQUE
By IAiN

RAMSAY*

This essay is a critique of current legal and public policy discourse
concerning the power of advertising to affect consumer tastes and
preferences. Two models are critiqued: advertising as information and
advertising as preference manipulation. These models are then contrasted
with approaches drawn from cultural studies which, drawing on
interpretive, rather than empirical, knowledge, suggest an alternative
understanding of the role of advertising in a society dominated by
"institutions of normalization" rather than by law. As a reflective critique,
the essay does not conclude with any blueprint for reform but argues for
greater study of the contradictory strands in consumer culture and of the
extent to which consumption practices may become sites for social
transformation.

I. INTRODUCTION
C'est le sens qui fait vendre!

Who decides what counts as knowledge about advertising,
and who knows what needs to be decided about the role of
C
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Brooks, Judy Fudge, Harry Glasbeek, Reuben Hasson, Allan Hutchinson, Carol Smart, Colin
Scott, and Toni Williams for comments on earlier drafts. An earlier draft of this paper was
presented at the 19th Annual Commercial and Consumer Law Workshop in Toronto, October
1989. This paper is related to a research project entitled "An Intellectual History of
Regulation of Advertising to Children in Quebec, the Rest of Canada and the USA 197089" funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
1 R. Barthes, Systne de la mode (Paris: Seuil, 1967), quoted in J. Culler, Barthes
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1983) at 74.
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The familiar questions of

power and knowledge are central themes in this essay. Like many
people in our society, I believe that advertising does have an effect
on me. Although I am not certain exactly how this works, I am not
completely happy about these effects. I worry that we are prisoners
of a false necessity:3 that a contingent phenomenon of commercial
propaganda has become regarded as a natural form4 so that it is
difficult to imagine a world without it.5 I am sceptical of claims
that the full relationship of advertising to cultural and social
formations can be understood by studies which attempt to
empirically measure its short term impact. 6 How advertising relates
2 "[Ihe right to decide what is true is not independent of the right to decide what is
just' See J.-P. Lyotard, The Post Moden Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G.
Bennington & B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984) at 8.
3 The recent work of Roberto Unger is dominated by a concern that politics and social
theory should not be constrained by false necessity. See False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian
Social Theory in the Service of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1987).
4 See R. Barthes, Mythologies (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972) at 11.
5 Patricia Williams voices similar sentiments in "Commercial Rights and Constitutional
Wrongs" (1990) 49 Md. L Rev. 293. Stephen Fox commences a popular history of advertising
by stating that "practically everyone dislikes it ...
Nobody believes it, or admits to believing it.
It usually appeals to the less agreeable aspects of human nature: greed, vanity, insecurity,
competitiveness, materialism ...
But there it is, one of the dominant forces in twentieth century
America. Among the pillars of our popular culture, advertising stands with TV, sports,
movies, pop music, and the print media as unavoidable features of modern life." See 7he
Mirror Makers (New York: Morrow, 1984) at 7.
6 See G. Murdock & N. Janus, Mass Communicationsand the Advertising Industry (Paris:
UNESCO, 1985) at 58 discussing empirical work: "Advertising's full impact on cultural
production and social consumption cannot be properly grasped within the framework they have
established. A more comprehensive approach requires us to work on the macro as well as the
micro level of analysis, to examine structural constraints as well as intentional actions, and to
develop the analysis of political economy and cultural formations as well as the psychology and
sociology of everyday behavior."
David Riesman, in the 1961 preface to his work The Lonely Crowd, indicates that
"it is obviously impossible neatly to separate the media from their wider cultural context, just
as it is impossible to separate the messages of advertising in the media from the 'messages'
carried by the goods themselves ...
We still believe that the long-run impact of the media on
the style of perception, the understanding (or, more often, the misunderstanding) of life, the
sense of what it means to be an American boy or girl, man or woman, or old folk, is immense
- more important than the often overestimated power of the media to push one marginally
differentiated product or candidate over another." See The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1961) at xlii.

1991]

A Critique

575

to patterns of consumption and how we constitute and reproduce

ourselves as consumers are important political issues on which a
society should have a democratic dialogue. But how does one
engage in a "good" democratic dialogue when one senses that

advertising may be shaping the dialogue?7 These are puzzles which
do not seem to have obvious answers to me.

Yet, I feel the

dichotomies within which existing public policy debates are
structured to be tired and unhelpful. They do not clarify the issues
or liberate me from my iron cage. Nor does policy discourse seem
able to connect advertising to other locations of education and
socialisation in consumption found in contemporary capitalist
societies!
In this article, I want to address these themes of knowledge

and power by interrogating a set of arguments which are routinely
marshalled against the regulation of advertising practices in the area
of taste construction and transfer. I include, within this topic, the
general issue of the commodification of taste and specific issues such
as advocacy or image advertising.9

Several arguments are made

against regulation of advertising practices in this area. First, there
is the claim that regulation is a paternalistic interference with
individual preferences. This is usually coupled with the claim that
7 This point is made by Magder who summarizes Leiss, Kline, & Jhally, infra, note 65
as arguing that "the pervasiveness of advertising in modem consumer societies only enhances
the undemocratic structure of the market place; open, collective discussion over noncommercial relations between people and objects is non-existent or marginalized." See T.
Magder, 'Taking Culture Seriously: A Political Economy of Communications" in W. Clement
& G. Williams, eds, The New Canadian Political Economy (Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1989) 278 at 287-88.
8 On this topic, see the readings in R. Dale, G. Esland & M. MacDonald, eds, Schooling
and Capitalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976). In particular, see the extracts by
H. Gintis, C. Karier, S.Bowles, and P. Bourdieu.
9 Advocacy advertising, where companies do not attempt to sell directly their product,
but stress the generally beneficial role which the company or free enterprise plays in the
community, has grown significantly over the past two decades. It was partly a response to the
perceived "legitimacy gap" facing large corporations in the late 60s and early 70s. Joyce
Nelson, in Sultans of Sleaze (Toronto: Between The Lines, 1989), describes how these
campaigns are part of a broader "communications strategy" in which public relations plays a
central role in helping to ensure that public expectations meet corporate goals or change the
symbolism (but not the substance) of corporate performance to meet public goals. See also
S.P. Sethi, Advocacy Advertising and the Large Corporation (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1977).
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proponents of regulation are both elitist and anti-democratic: they
are denigrators of popular taste and mass consumer culture and
their vantage point is that of the intellectual outsider condemning
popular culture 0 A variation of this position is to admit the
possibility of advertising's power to shape values, but to claim that
regulation in this area involves difficult and controversial value
judgments which the agency/court is ill-suited institutionally to
make. This argument is often used in conjunction with one which
points to critics' inability to provide objective measures of harm
suffered (for example, in terms of welfare losses or psychological
harm) or criteria for identifying unacceptable claims.12 On this view,

10 See section IV, infra at 33. A comprehensive analysis of deceptive advertising in the
Harvard Law Review makes the sweeping statement that "intellectuals since Aristotle have had
a special dislike for the materialism of the marketplace." See "Developments in the Law Deceptive Advertising" (1966-67) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1005 at 1013. Milton Friedman states
that the "real objection of most critics of advertising is not that advertising manipulates tastes
but that the public at large has meretricious tastes - that is, tastes that do not agree with the
critics." See Free to Choose (New York: Penguin Books, 1980) at 266. In response to
Galbraith's argument, see infira, note 46, that production creates wants, Hayek argues that very
few wants are innate and that many preferences are learnt. This does not mean, however, that
because individuals do not have independently determined desires for culture or literature that
artistic production creates the wants. See F. Hayek, "The Non Sequitur of the Dependence
Effect" (1960) 27 Southern Econ. J.346
A variation of Friedman's criticism is to argue that consumerist concerns about
advertising reflect the values of the "liberal upper middle class." See R.K. Winter, "Economic
Regulation vs. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism" (1972-73) 82 Yale LJ.
890 at 902. See also his following comments: "When Mr. Nader criticises the food industry
for taking steps to 'sharpen and meet superficially consumer tastes at the cost of other critical
consumer needs' one may fairly ask whose judgment it is that a taste is superficial and whose
judgment it is that a 'need' is 'critical'" See The Consumer Advocate Versus The Consumer
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1973) at 7. See also G. Stigler, "Private Vice
and Public Virtue" (1961) 4 J.Law & Econ. 1.
A further strategy is to characterize the critic as a romantic reactionary to modern
technology and social organization who harkens back to some golden age. Thus, Held asks
whether the Frankfurt School is merely a "perennial spiritualistic reaction - romantic, in the
last instance - against technique and modern social organisation." See D. Held, Introduction
to Critical Theory: Horkheimerto Habermas (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1980)
at 40.
In this vein, Harold Mendelsohn's review of Neil Postman's critique of
commercialization of the media, Amusing Ourselves to Death (New York: Penguin Books,
1985), argues that Postman's view of the past "is strictly Norman Rockwell throughout. His
view of the past embraces a blueberry-pie, old oaken table, mythic America." See (1987) 16
Contemp. Soc. at 555.
See below, section IV at 607.
12 See infra, note 20.

A Critique

1991]

the presumption should be against "intervention" with preferences in
the market until there are solid data to justify regulation.
Meanwhile, although there are insufficient data to justify
government regulation, a common response has been to rely on the
which is paradoxically
lighter touch of industry self-regulation
13
justified in terms of specialist expertise.
These arguments are part of a mainstream public policy
discourse dominated by what might loosely be described as liberal
individualism in which the central issues are those of individual
freedom versus paternalism and private markets versus public
regulation!

4

They are also dependent on economic and social

science knowledge which claims to provide the truth about
advertising.

By truth, I do not mean a set of truths about

advertising, but rather an authoritative discourse which claims to
identify the relevant issues, procedures, and approaches for
understanding the power and effects of advertising.1 I shall argue
that both the arguments and assumptions of this dominant public
policy discourse are unconvincing, at least insofar as they apply to
setting an agenda, structuring arguments concerning the power of
13 See, generally, J.J. Boddewyn, Advertising Self Regulation and OutsideParticipation:A
MultinationalComparison (New York: Quorum Books, 1988).
14 I realize that there are several varieties of liberalism and that some liberals would
disagree with the above characterization. However, it does seem to me that my description
constitutes that form of liberalism which has dominated legal and public policy discourse in
this area. See below, section IV at 605. For example, Richard Craswell, in developing a
normative theory of deceptive advertising, is concerned to ensure that his theory is compatible
with liberal theories of individualism and freedom. He notes that "most liberal political
theories posit that individuals should be allowed to reach their own decisions, free from state
intervention restricting the decisionmaking process." See R. Craswell, "Interpreting Deceptive
Advertising" (1985) 65 B.U.L. Rev. 657 at 664. David Cohen also adopts this liberal
approach, noting both that "consumer protection policies can conveniently be placed on a
continuum reflecting the level of intervention in the market by government" and the liberal
economists' aversion to "the paternalistic implications of standard setting" See D. Cohen,
"Can It Really Be Unconstitutional to Regulate Product Safety Information?" (1990) 17 Can.
Bus. LJ. 55 at 60-61. I discuss these issues at greater length in I. Ramsay, Consumer
Protection: Text and Materials (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989) c. 1 & 2.
15 I rely here on the approach outlined by Foucault, who argues that "there is a battle
'for truth,' or at least 'around truth' - it being understood once again that by truth I do not
mean 'the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,' but rather 'the
ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects
of power attached to the true.'" See M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings 1972-1977, trans. C. Gordon (Brighton, Eng.: Harvester Press, 1980) at 132.
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advertising,
and furthering dialogue on the nature of advertising in
16
society.
In Part II, I examine two approaches to advertising regulation: advertising as information and as preference manipulation.
These approaches take us to the limits of current public policy
discourse, illustrating the distinctions between conservative and more
progressive viewpoints. A central point here is that, even on its
own terms, the conservative view of advertising as information does
not provide a coherent limit on regulation of advertising. In Part
Im, I develop my critique by exploring the relationship of cultural
theory to advertising control. This approach locates advertising
within the study of the production of meaning in society and the
relationship of these meanings to powerful interests. It suggests a
different perspective on the construction of preferences, the
supposed distinction between elite and mass culture, and what counts
as knowledge about the social world. Taken together, the insights
of cultural studies could have significant implications for the
substantive and institutional issues surrounding the regulation of
advertising. However, they have rarely surfaced in law and public
policy argument. In Part IV, therefore, I investigate law's truth
about advertising, particularly concerning the topic of advertising and
taste construction. I note the "pull of the policy audience ''17 and the
consequent marginalization of work drawn from cultural studies.
The recent decisions under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms'8 concerning commercial speech provide an opportunity for
deconstructing law's truth.
Since this essay is critique rather than prescription, I do not
conclude with any blueprint for reform. I do suggest, however, that
any critical theory of advertising must be linked to the politics of
social relations in a consumer society and to a detailed understanding
of the politics of everyday consumption. At the same time, I
implicitly raise the question of the importance of law as a site of

16 See, generally, sections III and IV, below at 591 and 605.
17 S. Silbey & A. Sarat, 'The Pull of the Policy Audience" (1988) 10 Law & Po'y 97.
18

Part I of the Constitution Ac4 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.11.
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social struggle over the meaning of consumption and consumer

relationships in contemporary society.
II. THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY
A. Information Theory: Technocracy and Market Failure
We cannot walk before we toddle,
Though we may toddle far too long,
If we embrace a lovely Model
That is consistent, clear, and wrong.19

The dominant approach to regulation locates the control of
advertising within the economic paradigm of welfare economics.

Government regulation is a response to failures in markets for
information. The emphasis is on harnessing market incentives
through instruments such as mandatory disclosures which "consumers
could then use to protect their interests in advance of injury."20 In

the words of Pitofsky's influential article, "[P]rotection of consumers
against advertising fraud should not be a broad, theoretical effort to
achieve Truth, but rather a practical enterprise to ensure the
existence of reliable data which in turn will facilitate an efficient and
reliable competitive market process. '21 This approach draws on a

branch of law and economics scholarship, the main premise of which
is that advertising is a much more significant source of market

information than had been thought 22 by earlier generations of
19 IE. Boulding, Beasts Ballads and Bouldingisms ed. by R.P. Beilock (New Brunswick,
NJ.: Transaction Books, 1980) quoted in U.M. Franklin The Real World of Technolog
(Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1990) at 32.
20
R. Pitofsky, "Beyond Nader Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising"
(1977) 90 Harv. L.Rev. 661 at 671.
21 bid at 674. Pitofsky rejected the inclusion of psychological exploitation within the
development of unfairness regulation because it would be impossible to develop coherent
standards of exploitation. He notes at 684 that "charges that an ad, though not deceptive,
tends to take advantage of a vulnerable group will usually raise controversial questions of
excessive government paternalism."
22 The following articles by P. Nelson were important, developing from the earlier
speculations of George Stigler contained in "The Economics of Information" (1961) 69 J.Pol.
Econ. 213: "Information and Consumer Behavior" (1970) J. Pol. Econ. 311 and "Advertising
as Information" (1974) 82 J.Pol. Econ. 729. These were assimilated into the legal literature
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economistsP The critical bite of this literature lies in its challenge
to the conventional wisdom that deception is per se bad. It is
argued that, in many cases, rules which prevent deception of some
consumers would filter out information which might be useful to
other consumers. 24 Justifications for regulation must be found in the
entire information environment of a particular market.
The information approach appears to promise several
benefits for policy makers. Reliance on the supposedly weak value
judgments embedded in the norm of consumer sovereignty in welfare
economics 25 appears to foreclose the necessity of making difficult
and controversial value judgments concerning the impact of
advertising. "Intervention" in the market is necessary merely to
make a central social institution work more effectively. It does not
involve a challenge to the market mechanism, nor does it seem to
paternalistically overrule consumer preferences or favour one
particular social group. Both consumers and producers could
therefore benefit.26 Economic models and empirical data would

through, for example, A. Schwartz & L Wilde, "Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis" (1978-79) 127 U. Pa. L Rev. 630
and H. Beales, R. Craswell, & S. Salop, "The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information"
(1981) 24 J. Law & Econ. 491.
23 Thus, R.H. Coase, writing in 1977, claimed that advertising is "clearly part of the
market for ideas. Intellectuals have not, in general, welcomed this other occupant of their
domain. And the feeling of antipathy has been shared by economists, who, until comparatively
recently, have tended to deplore rather than to analyze the effects of advertising. In recent
years advertising has been studied more rigorously, and this has been accompanied by, or
perhaps we should say has resulted in, a more sympathetic attitude to advertising." See
"Advertising and Free Speech" (1977) 6 J. Leg. Stud. 1 at 8-9.
24 This is not the same issue as the well worn discussion of whether the law should
protect the reasonable or gullible consumer. See, for example, Beales, Craswell & Salop,
supra, note 22 at 495-501; R. Reich, "Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech" (1979)
54 N.Y.U.L Rev. 775 and Craswell, supra, note 14.
25 On this topic, see, for example, C. Rowley, "Social Sciences and Law- The Relevance
of Economic Theories" (1981) 1 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 391 at 399-403.
26 Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra, note 22 at 513-14, in discussing the advantages of
information remedies over product standards, argue that "information remedies allow
consumers to protect themselves according to personal preferences rather than place on
regulators the difficult task of compromising diverse preferences with a common standard ...
[They] place the burden of enforcement of quality on informed consumers in conjunction with
marketplace forces."

1991]

A Critiqi:e

581

transform policy making into a relatively hard-headed evaluation of
welfare losses from information failures.
There are, however, several problems with this approach.
First, it has not proved a simple task to identify with empirical
precision those market situations where intervention is justified.
This is indeed a major conclusion of a leading article on intervention
in consumer markets which indicates the difficulties of establishing
clear rules in this area.2 7 It is always possible that private markets

for information or other information substitutes might arise to
compensate for potential failures. Thus, Posner and Pitofsky could
diverge significantly in their assessment of the need for government
regulation of misleading advertising,28 notwithstanding that both
authors adopt a market failure approach and the deeper assumption
29

of a private economic realm into which government "intervenes."
Robert Reich suggests a possible technical solution to these
difficulties, arguing that the policy issue should be conceived as an

attempt to balance a "free flow" against a "clean flow" of

information 3 0 This balancing should be done with the objective of
making the market work more effectively. In Reich's view, there
will be an optimal amount of market information at the point

27 Beales, Craswell, and Salop conclude at 532 by noting that "it is extremely difficult
to develop many hard-and-fast rules and that the proper policy to be followed will depend
heavily on the facts of each case."
28 See R. Posner, "The Federal Trade Commission" (1969-70) 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47.
Posner rejects the need for a federal administrative agency to regulate misleading advertising.
Commenting on the information failure argument for public regulation, he notes that
"competitors are not the only source of product information to the consumer in a free market.
It is relatively rare for a consumer to deal with only one firm, one source of information, in
making a purchase. Consumers consult physicians, appraisers, securities brokers, home
improvement contractors, newspaper and magazine columnists, interior decorators, travel
agents, and a host of others whose business it is to advise consumers on choosing among
competing products and whose livelihood depends to no small extent on the honesty and
accuracy of their advice ... These 'information brokers' do not exist primarily to prevent
deception, but they have that effect." Compare Pitofsky, supra, note 20 at 667-69.
29 See Pitofsky, supra, note 20 at 667: "Where there are instances of consumer abuse
or exploitation as a result of false, misleading or irrelevant advertising, it does not necessarily
follow that these need be remedies by governmental intrusion into the marketplace."
30 See Reich, supra, note 24.
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represented by the most efficient allocation between seller and
consumer of the costs of searching for a product3
Achieving this optimal point is obviously an issue which can
only be definitively solved in the context of a case by case analysis
and on the basis of detailed empirical information. In order to
avoid the difficulties of such case by case fact finding, Reich argues
for the use of presumptions, a standard legal technique. Thus, on
the basis of the economics of information, he suggests a number of
possible presumptions; for example, that it is presumptively
inefficient to restrain price advertising, but not door to door sales.
Information standards would be presumptively efficient, since words
such as "natural" are difficult for consumers to verify, and unless
there is a standard, the costs of comparison shopping are increased
substantially. Presumptions aside, there is, as Stephen Breyer notes,
much room for disagreement within this approach as to whether
regulation is justified. 32 These disagreements may ultimately turn on
whether one starts with preferences in favour of markets or
regulation.
Second, the normative basis of this approach remains to
correct preferences in order to achieve more rational consumer
decision-making.
It is assumed that, but for the misleading
information, consumers would have revealed different preferences
which they would have preferred to those based on misleading
information.33 Regulation is, therefore, "an aid to free decisionmaking rather than an interference.'3 4 Such a counterfactual
argument might, however, be extended to a wide variety of potential
beliefs induced by advertising which leads to "irrational" consumer
decision-making. An attempted distinction between these situations
is that false factual beliefs are more easily established and do not
require controversial value judgments about the worth of preferences
31 Md.at 792-97.
32 S.Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) at
28.
33 Or as the Harvard Law Review puts it, "leading customers to purchase products that
do not match their wants." See "Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising," supra,
note 10 at 1010.
34 Craswell, supra, note 14 at 664.
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or the difficulties of separating rational from irrational preferences. 35
There is, moreover, widespread agreement that false factual beliefs
are undesirable.
Yet, the basic point remains. There is in principle no
distinction between correcting preferences based on misleading
information and correcting preferences based on other undesirable
influences on preference formation. Refusing to look behind
consumers' revealed preferences reflects both a value judgment
which is hardly non-controversial and a particular view of the
political process as merely following preferences. Take, for example,
the argument that it is unnecessary to police price claims which state
that they are "lowest prices ever" or an "all-time low price. 3 6 This
argument is based on the hypothesis that many individuals will be
sceptical about such claims and that, since these prices are in any
event likely to be low, the many consumers who take advantage of
this offer will benefit. This argument depends on many factual
assumptions, not the least of which is that we (policy-makers) can
identify who will benefit and that this group would not have
preferred to purchase a different product. Moreover, we assume
that consumers faced with an array of these types of claims are
37
acting rationally, rather than fighting for control over their choices.
Perhaps it is easy for policy-makers to make this type of judgment
because these assumptions about consumer behavior are, for them,
intuitively plausible and are ones which they feel would appeal to
many other individuals. Perhaps, but that is not the same as a
rigorous, scientific statement about consumer behaviour. Within this

"While there are accepted procedures for determining the truth about the number of
calories in a soft drink, or about the effect of calories on weight loss, there is no similarly
accepted method of determining whether wanting to imitate a television model is good or bad.
De gustibus non est disputandum ... there is no equally widely-shared definition of a rational
decisionmaking process. The distinction between rational and irrational is much harder to
define than the distinction between true or false." Ibid. at 666-67.
36 See Pitofsky, supra, note 20 at 687.
37 On this issue, see R. West, "Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent
in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner" (1985-86) 99 Harv.
L Rev. 384. See also the reply by Richard Posner, "Colloquy. The Ethical Significance of
Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West" (1985-86) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1431.
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approach, there is a curious confusion of analytic modelling,
armchair empiricism, and normative assumptions.38
Finally, a further assumption is that the control of advertising
will be located in a body whose role and legitimacy emerge from
following existing preferences, rather than attempting to change
them. For this reason, the approach of information theory appears
to be an attractive basis for carving out a regulatory mandate. But
this is also a controversial and possibly naive view of the role of
political institutions, such as courts, and the political process
generally. 39
The information approach begins to seem less hard-headed
in the light of these comments. Moreover, from both a theoretical
and policy viewpoint, its neglect of issues of advertising and
preference formation seem curious. The argument that neo-classical
economics has no theory of taste formation is, as noted, hardly a
sufficient reason for ignoring this topic. Advertising and preference
formation would appear to provide an ideal opportunity for theory
development. From a policy viewpoint, the growth of advertising is
associated with economic models of oligopoly. Yet, the information
school continues to work within the neo-classical model.
As a form of discourse, however, it remains attractive to
many academics and bureaucrats, perhaps because it appears to
legitimate outcomes in non-ideological terms and the pretensions to
power of "a particular subset of the ruling class - the liberal and
conservative policy analysts. 40
38 Unger captures this issue neatly. "The chief instrument of the law and economics
school is the equivocal use of the market concept. These analysts give free rein to the very
mistake that the increasing formalization of microeconomics was largely meant to avoid: the
identification of the abstract market idea or the abstract circumstance of maximizing choice
with a particular social and institutional complex. As a result, an analytic apparatus intended,
when rigorous, to be entirely free of restrictive assumptions about the workings of society and
entirely subsidiary to an empirical or normative theory that needs independent justification
gets mistaken for a particular empirical and normative vision." See R. Unger, 'Trhe Critical
Legal Studies Movement" (1982-83) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 563 at 574.
39 See below, section II at 588-90.
40 See D. Kennedy, 'Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power" (1981-82) 41
Md. L. Rev. 563 at 604: "Efficiency analysis, like many another mode of professional

discourse, is an obscure mix of the normative and the merely descriptive; it requires training
to master, it provides a basis for an internal hierarchy of the profession that crosscuts political
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B. Preference Manipulation
Economists have long recognised that advertising may change
tastes as well as provide information. 41 The relatively thin theory of
consumer behavior evident in the neo-classical economic model of
consumer sovereignty - that people choose what they prefer - has
never completely dominated the literature. The conception of
42
preferences as socially conditioned goes back at least to Veblen.
In the 1920s, Chamberlin stressed the importance of selling costs in
his theory of monopolistic competition. He argued that advertising
might manipulate preferences through taste transfer, 43 a concept
which seems particularly applicable to the current operations of
multinational corporations in the nations of the South.44 The
dominant market structure of oligopoly, where firms cannot sell all
their products at the market price and where price competition may
be counterproductive, creates enormous incentives for image

alignments. Its high value in legitimating the outcomes of group conflict in "nonideological"
terms is the basis for the professional group's claim to special rewards and a secure niche in
the good graces of the ruling class as a whole."
41 See Coase, supra, note 23.
42 See T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions
(New York: MacMillan, 1905).
43 "Advertising affects demands ... by altering the wants themselves. The distinction
between this and altering the channel through which existing wants are satisfied ... seems to
be clear analytically ... selling methods which play upon the buyer's susceptibilities, which use
against him laws of psychology with which he is unfamiliar and therefore against which he
cannot defend himself, which frighten or flatter or disarm him - all of these have nothing
to do with his knowledge. They are not informative; they are manipulative. They create a
new scheme of wants by rearranging his motives. As a result, demand for the advertised
product is increased, that for other products is correspondingly diminished." See E.
Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 6th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1950) at 119-20.
44 Concrete examples of this are provided in S. Langdon, MultinationalCorporationsand
Development in Kenya (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970). Chandra Muzaffar comments
that "a massive transfer of tastes and fads from the capitalist centres to their peripheries has
been taking place in the last twenty years." See C. Muzaffar, "Changing Lifestyles Today for
Tomorrow: The Spiritual Basis" in E. Wheelwright, ed., Consumers,TransnationalCorporations
and Development (Sydney- University of Sydney, 1986) 1 at 5. See also J. Sinclair, Images
Incorporated. AdvertisingAs Industry and Ideology (London: Croom Helm, 1987) c. 7.
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advertising.4 5 Galbraith's concept of the "dependence effect," where

producers use advertising to create wants rather than respond to
consumer needs, is probably the best known modem statement of
the preference manipulation thesis in relation to those consumer
markets dominated by large corporations operating in oligopolistic
markets.4 6
Most economic analysis in this area has concentrated on the
potential impact of product differentiation and image advertising on
creating monopoly power and consequently elevated prices.
Although there is evidence in some consumer markets of a
statistically significant relation between intensive image
differentiation and monopoly profits, the issue remains contested.47
It is difficult to measure these relationships, particularly given the
quality variable. Arguments that consumers are being taken
advantage of may always be met by the counter-argument that
consumers may be willing to pay more for the assurance of brand
quality or the status of the "right" beer. Beyond egregious cases,
such as household bleach which is supplied in a standardized
solution, the economic study of this area is hampered by the

45 See, for example, W. Baumol, A. Blinder & A. Scarth, Economics: Principles
and
Policy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988) at 485-86. E. Herman argues that "the
long-established norm of market structure and behavior has been that of oligopoly, that is, the
constrained rivalry of a few interdependent sellers who compete mainly by means of product
differentiation." See E. Herman, CorporateContro CorporatePower (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982) at 1. See also the general discussion in F. Scherer, IndustrialMarket
Structure and Economic Perfonnmance,2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980) at 386-405.
46 "The even more direct link between production and wants is provided by the
institutions of modern advertising and salesmanship. These cannot be reconciled with the
notion of independently determined desires, for their central function is to create desires to bring into being wants that previously did not exist." See J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent
Society, 4th ed. (New York: New American Library, 1984) at 129. In his later work,
Economics and the Public Purpose (New York: New American Library, 1975), Galbraith
modified his thesis as restricted to those areas of the economy dominated by large
bureaucratic organisations operating in oligopolistic conditions.
47

See the general discussion in Scherer, supra, note 45 at 390-98. The main study relied
on to show a significant relation between image advertising and monopoly power is by
Comanor and Wilson. See W. Comanor & T. Wilson, "The Effect of Advertising on
Competition: A Survey" (1979) 17 J. Econ. Literature 453. Their research was challenged
by L Telser in "Some Aspects of the Economics of Advertising" (1960) 41 J. Bus. 166.
Scherer seems to admit that the difference in viewpoint is ideological. See Scherer, supra,
note 45 at 393.
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difficulties of holding many variables constant (especially quality) and
the lack of any clear norms as to the optimal level of product
differentiation.48 It is very difficult for economists to make scientific
statements about how much variety and differentiation there should
be in the consumer marketplace.
Preference manipulation and taste transfer also require
economists to recognize the interdependence of utilities: an
individual's welfare may depend on the consumption decisions of
their peers.49 Economists encounter difficulties in making a clear
statement of the social welfare issues in situations where advertising
exploits this interdependency. Perhaps the best known example is
the frequent model changes in u.s. automobiles in the 1950s. Was
this a positive contribution to social welfare? Scherer comments
that
clearly, new car buyers pay more than if model changes were effected less often.
Equally clearly, they freely elect to do so, for they have the option of holding on
to their present auto longer or buying last year's model or an import restyled less
frequently. By the stern criterion of consumer sovereignty, styling rivalry would
seem to emerge with only minor scars. Still this is not completely convincing. The
interdependence of consumer preferences complicates matters. Smith may buy a
new model only because he fears that if he does not and neighbour Jones does, his
utility will be reduced. Jones perceives the situation symmetrically, and both end
up buying new models, though neither might if theyr
could find some way to enforce
50
mutual (and more widespread) buying restraint.

The pervasiveness of advertising's exploitation of interdependent
utilities - the "anxious 'housewife,"' the newcomer in town, the
person who cannot make friends, the halitosis scare, the importance
of achieving the standard package of goods and services which
usually exceeds significantly the statistical average - underlines the
importance of thinking seriously about the possibility of the political

For a useful discussion of this issue, see B. Dunlop, D. McQueen & M. Trebilcock,
CanadianCompetition Poicy (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1987) at 92-102.
49 Scherer argues that buying a product to keep up with trendsetters "can destroy utility
along with creating it. To be sure, by responding to the stimulus and buying an advertised
product, consumers may feel they are gaining something worthwhile. But it is not clear they
have done any more than return to the satisfaction level they would have maintained without
the persuasive assault on their preference structures." See supra, note 45 at 381.
50

Iid.at 398-99.

See F. Fisher, Z. Griiches & C. Kaysen, "The Costs of Automobile
Model Changes Since 1949" (1962) 70 J. Pol. Econ. 433.
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process enforcing Scherer's "mutual buying restraint." It is as if
consumers are caught in a classic prisoner's dilemma, where some
mechanism for mutual cooperation might satisfy individual desires
which are hampered by problems of collective coordination. 51
Although many economists might agree with Scherer, they seem to
be frozen in indecision when faced with suggesting policy
prescriptions. They point to the potential futility of regulating this
type of advertising, the difficulties of selecting the appropriate
target, and the fear that government is unlikely to outperform the
market in determining the optimal level of product differentiation.5 2
It is as if the scientific rhetoric of economics runs out at the
end of every discussion of product differentiation and preference
manipulation, so that we are left with the adage that the issue of
the social costs of these advertising practices involves moral
judgments over which reasonable persons may disagree. 53 A public
policy discourse and institutional framework that stresses the
importance of expert judgment as a basis for decision making is
unlikely, therefore, to focus for an extended period on this topic.
Any agency which does
is likely to disappear in clouds of conflicting
54
social science data.
The economic work on advertising and product
differentiation suggests the need for further probing of the sources
of consumer preferences. Recent progressive-liberal work 55 has
challenged both the thin theory of consumer sovereignty in the
economic literature and the conception of politics as following
private preferences. The challenge draws on psychological and
51 See, generally, Sunstein, infra, note 55.
52 See Scherer, supra, note 45 at 404.
53

ibid. at 380.

54 This is, perhaps, what happened to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in some of
its celebrated cases in. the early 1970s, such as the I Wonderbread litigation, infra, note
126. See D. Rice, Consumer Transactions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975) at 750-60.
55 I am thinking particularly of articles such as C. Sunstein, "Legal Interference with
Private Preferences" (1986) 53 U. Chi. L Rev. 1129 and his text After the Rights Revolution:
Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). These
works provide a useful source of references in psychology, economics, and political theory
which furnishes the basis for critiquing the thin theory of private preferences in neo-classical
economics.
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economic work on the limits of consumer rationality and a
conception of politics as the opportunity for the moulding and
transformation of preferences: an opportunity for the "public and
rational discussion about the common good."56 Citizens may wish,
future choices which as
like Ulysses, to foreclose or restrict
57
to.
succumb
might
consumers they
Existing preferences are, within this conception, a function
of current legal rules and social conditions and are, therefore,
shifting and not static. They are social constructions. There is,
therefore, no such thing as social or legal institutions simply
"following" preferences. To do so is to make a conscious choice of
endorsing a particular set of preferences.58 Recognition of these
arguments reduces objections to public measures which attempt to
change preferences in order to achieve greater social welfare or
individual autonomy.
The main bite of this progressive critique is the attempt to
change

the

terms

of

debate

over

government

regulation,

problematizing simple conceptions of paternalism and consumer
sovereignty and arguing that many regulatory programmes which
appear to interfere with consumer preferences, in fact, promote
values of autonomy and social welfare and reflect democratic desires.

56 "Much more important ... is the idea that the central concern of politics should be
the transfonnationof preferences rather than their aggregation. On this view the core of the
political process is the public and rational discussion about the common good, not the isolated
act of voting according to private preferences ... [politics involves] purging the private, selfish
or idiosyncratic preferences in open and public debate." See J. Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies
in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) at 35. Owen
Fiss has articulated a similar model as a normative basis for adjudication. See 0. Fiss, 'The
Forms of Justice" (1979) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
57

See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality andIrrationality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979). Examples might include door to door sales, seat belts, the
use of hazardous products, and controls on life style advertising. Public broadcasting might
be justified as dealing with the situation where the short term costs of appreciating this type
of broadcasting are high, but the long term benefits are higher.
58 Neatly put by Bernard Williams in his critique of utilitarianism: "To engage in those
processes which utilitarianism regards as just 'following' is ... itself doing something: it is
choosing to endorse those preferences, or some set of them, which lie on the surface, as
determined by such things as what people at a given moment regard as possible - something
which in its turn is affected by the activities of government." See J. Smart & B. Williams,
UtilitarianismFor and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) at 147-48.
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It also reiterates the point made by Realist writers, such as Hale 59
and Dawson,6° that the market is not a natural prepolitical
institution and that the particular form of market relations reflects
a political compromise backed up by state force. Issues of consumer
protection, such as control of advertising, may be viewed, therefore,
as establishing and changing ground rules, rather than as
"intervention" in a private sphere or paternalistically overruling
individual preferences.
This modified preference formation approach also leads to
some reflections on structure and agency in modern life. We seem,
within this approach, to be multiple selves 61 depending on the
institutional context. The social constructionism of sociology
challenges the agency of liberal philosophy.
Indeed, liberal
progressives, such as Sunstein, fear that acceptance of this "social
construction of preferences" approach may lead to the rejection of
autonomy and to the acceptance of relativism and tyranny. To
counter this possibility, Sunstein argues for a normative presumption
in favour of private choices.62 Without addressing this argument at
this point, the limitation of this work is that it has failed thus far to
examine carefully these issues of structure and agency within the
context of the structural forces which have historically shaped the
modern consumer society. It is this issue to which I now turn.

59 R. Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in A Supposedly Non Coercive State" (1923) 38
Pol. Sci. LQ. 470 and "Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty' (1943) 43 Colum. L. Rev.
603.
SThe system of 'free' contract described by nineteenth century theory is now coming
to be recognized as a world of fantasy, too orderly, too neatly contrived, and too harmonious
to correspond with reality. As welcome fiction is slowly displaced by sober fact, the regime

of 'freedom' can be visualized as merely another system, more elaborate and more highly
organized, for the exercise of economic pressure." See J. Dawson, 'Economic Duress and the

Fair Exchange in French and German Law" (1937) 11 Tul. L. Rev. 345.
61 See the discussion in D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
62 I do have difficulties with this position.

Accepting that preferences are socially

constructed implies no normative position as to which preferences should be respected. The
move from relativism to tyranny is also difficult to comprehend. It seems similar to the
implausible argument, in another context, that rejection of the possibility of universal values
based on human nature would lead to tyranny.
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I. CULTURAL THEORY:
FROM POLICY CRITIC TO
63
SOCIAL CRITIC
Culture is only true when implicitly critical and the mind which forgets
this revenges itself in the critics it breeds.&

A central concern of cultural studies 65 is with the social
production of meaning in society and the connection of these
63 See S. Brooks & A. Gagnon, Social Scientists and Politics in Canada: Between Clerisy
and Vanguard (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988) at 126.
64 T. Adorno, "Cultural Criticism and Society' in T. Adorno, Pr.ims (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT, 1988) 17 at 22.
65 Unfortunately, "cultural studies" is not an immediately recognisable discipline. John
Fiske, in Television Culture (London: Methuen, 1987) at 1, notes that it derives from
"particular inflections of Marxism, semiotics, post-structuralism, and ethnography." It is
obviously a vast area and I can do no more than scratch the surface in this section. There
is a large body of literature from a variety of disciplines which examines the significance of
the development of the consumer society as a cultural form. See, for example, the material
cited in W. Leiss, S. Kline & S. Jhally, Social Communication in Advertising (Toronto:
Methuen, 1986); G. McCracken, Culture and Consumption (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1988). See also the special issue on consumer culture in (1983) 1:3 Theory, Culture
and Society.
Early economic work includes Veblen, supra, note 42. Veblen's work was influential
on the later critiques by Galbraith in The Affluent Society, supra, note 46 and The New
IndustrialState (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967). It also influenced the popular works by
Packard on advertising; for example, see V. Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: D.
McKay, 1957). See also T. Scitofsky, The Joyless Economy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1976). Ecological critiques on the economic assumptions of the consumer society may
be found in F. Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1976); W. Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976). The
essay by Baudrillard, "Consumer Society" in M. Poster, ed., Jean Baudrillard Selected Writings
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 29 is a useful summary of a structural approach
to the consumption system as a part of the modern capitalist production system. An
influential essay on the development of consumer ideology and "the necessity of developing
a new type of man" to consume the fruits of mass production is Antonio Gramsci's
"Americanism and Fordism" in Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith, eds, Selections From The Prison
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, trans. Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith (London: Lawrence and
Wishart, 1971) 279. See also infra, note 77 and accompanying text. This influenced the work
of Stuart Ewen in Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of Consumer
Culture (New York McGraw Hill, 1976). See text accompanying note 69. See also R.W.
Fox & TJ.Lears, eds, The Cultureof Consumption: CriticalEssays in American History, 18801980 (New York Pantheon Books, 1983) [hereinafter The Culture of Consumption].
The development of cultural studies has spawned a large literature. See, for
example, the work of J. Williamson, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in
Advertising (London: Marion Boyars, 1978); R. Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (New
York: Penguin Books, 1963); P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of
Taste (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).
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meanings with powerful interests. The focus here is, therefore, not
the behavioral social scientists' concern with, for example, how
advertising causes certain effects in individuals or power as measured
through quantitative analysis of market performance. Rather, it is
how advertising and the media may work to "prefer certain meanings
of the world, to circulate some meanings rather than others and to
serve some social interests better than others." 66 The focus is on
how advertising and the media may be more or less effective in
producing and reproducing particular ideologies in society at large,
rather than the issue of its impact on particular individuals or
groups. From this perspective, the study of power is the ability to
shape perceptions, so that the existing order becomes a part of
commonsense, that is, a normalisation of contingent social
arrangements. 67
This type of inquiry draws on a different form of knowledge
than that of the scientific tradition. Our knowledge of the social
world is not solely scientific, but also interpretive. Within this
approach, rhetoric is not separate from reality, since reality is only
available "through the discourses we have available to make sense of
it."68 If our knowledge of social reality is partly constituted through
linguistic and cultural codes, then understanding how dominant
conceptions of reality are reproduced and others marginalised or
rejected may help in understanding how we constitute ourselves as
subjects, an enlightening and potentially emancipatory exercise.
Cultural studies has moved the debate on ideology from the issue
of false consciousness and the obscuring of the real relations of
capitalist society to the more general issue of cultural leadership in
society.

66 See Television Culture, ibid at 20.
67

Steven Lukes describes this type of power as the ability to shape perceptions "in such
a way that [individuals] accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they
can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural or unchangeable."
See S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (New York: MacMillan, 1974) at 24.
68 Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 42. A useful account of this approach, contrasting
it with empirical and behaviouristic approaches, is S. Hall, "The Rediscovery of Ideology:
Return of the Repressed in Media Studies" in M. Gurevitch et al, eds, Culture,Society and the
Media (London: Methuen, 1982) 56.
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An initial conception of advertising as an instrument of
social control is a theme both in historical studies69 of consumer
culture and the work of the Frankfurt School.70 At the risk of
oversimplification, the Frankfurt School underlined several
tendencies in the economic and cultural development of modem
capitalism. Within the system of production in monopoly capitalism,
the culture of consumption was an important aspect of social
The constitution of individuals as
integration and control.
consumers, rather than as workers or conservers, was important both
for the defusion of potential class antagonisms and for sustaining the
system of production. Later writers charted with greater precision
development and the importance of
the historical transitions in this
71
changes.
these
advertising to
The totalizing tendencies of the Frankfurt School's vision
were coupled with a pessimistic vision of growing corporate
72
authoritarianism, the deterioration of culture as a critical force,
increasing political passivity, and the deterioration of public life.
The following quotation from Marcuse summarises these concerns:

69 See Ewen, supra, note 65.
70 The following texts are most often referred to in discussions of the Frankfurt School
H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of
and consumer culture:
Advanced IndustrialSociety (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) and M. Horkheimer & T. Adorno,
"The Culture Industry- Enlightenment and Mass Deception" in M. Horkheimer & T. Adorno,
eds, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. 3. Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1986) 120.
A useful introduction to the work of this school may be found in Introduction to Critical
Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas,supra, note 10, c. 2 & 3 and D. Kellner, Critical Theory,
Marxism and Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) c. 6.
Ewen, supra, note 65, Leiss, supra, note 65, and the work of Christopher Lasch
are clearly influenced by the Frankfurt School. The theme of social integration and control
is also visible in the earlier structural work of Baudrillard who argues that:
We don't realize how much the current indoctrination into systematic and organized
consumption is the equivalent and the ewtension, in the twentieth century, of the great
indoctrinationof ruralpopulationsinto industriallabor,which occurredthroughoutthe
nineteenth century ... Consumer needs and satisfactions are productive forces which
are now constrained and rationalized like all others.
See Jean Baudrillant Selected Writings, supra, note 65 at 50.
71 See, for example, Ewen, supra, note 65 and R. Williams, Dream Worlds: Mass
Consumption in Late Nineteenth Century France (Berkeley. University of California Press,

1982).
72 See, in particular, Horkheimer & Adorno, supra, note 70.
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[D]omination - in the guise of affluence and liberty - extends to all spheres of
private and public existence, integrates all authentic opposition, absorbs all
alternatives ...
Its supreme promise is an ever-more-comfortable life for an evergrowing number of people who, in a strict sense, cannot imagine a qualitatively
different universe of discourse and action, for the capacity to contain and

manipulate
subversive imagination and effort is an integral part of the given
73
society."

The work of the Frankfurt School is important in drawing attention
to the role of ideology and culture in sustaining domination.
Ideological analysis and critique might, therefore, be as important as
studies of changing modes of production and the expansion of
markets. In addition, it suggested that the arena of consumption
might become an important site for political struggle. The discipline
of consumption might lead to potential revolt, as in the case of the
discipline of the workplace. These issues were, however, never
developed in the work of Marcuse and Adorno. Their intellectual
stance was that of an outsider contrasting an ideal society with the
debased state of our own, but providing little positive guidance on
how to get from here to there. 74 Specifically, there was little
discussion of how dominant ideology reproduced itself. Moreover,
consumers seemed homogenous and passive in the face of the
onslaughts of the culture industry. There seemed to be little role
for resistance to the powers of production. Consumption was a
seductive form of captivity.75 They problematised, however, the
development of a critical theory of society which would

73Marcuse, supra, note 70 at 18 & 23. The influence of Marcuse may be seen
in
Lasch's comment that "mass consumption [is] part of a larger pattern of dependence,
disorientation, and loss of control ...
The social arrangements that support a system of mass

production and mass consumption tend to discourage initiative and self-reliance and to
promote dependence, passivity, and a spectatorial state of mind both at work and at play."
See C. Lasch, The MinimalSelf (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984) at 27. In Canada, Harold
Innis feared that the new mass media would result in the destruction of creative thought. In
his view, "[Tihe masses are inert, even non-existent ...
at worst the illiterate consumers to
whom the new media must pander." Quoted in Magder, supra, note 7 at 281.

74 In Stanley Fish's terms, "critique in its positive aspect looks very much like a project
without content." See "Critical Self Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We're Doing" in
S. Fish,Doing What Comes Naturaly: Change,Rhetoric, and the Practiceof Theory in Literary

and Legal Studies (London: Duke University Press, 1989) 436 at 446.
75 See The Culture of Consumption, supra, note 65 at x.
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features of
simultaneously provide understanding of the oppressive 76
society and stimulation to transformation and liberation.
Focus on the central role of cultural leadership originated
with the work of Gramsci. In 1929, in a prescient article titled
"Americanism and Fordism," Gramsci argued that an important
aspect of the new Fordist system of rationalized mass production
would be the creation of a new consciousness among individuals,
reflecting "the necessity of elaborating a new type of man."77 The
creation of a consumer culture and associated patterns of
consumption were a necessary part of this new system of production.
This would not be achieved mechanically through brute force or the
power of business to mould opinion through advertising. It also
required the intellectual and moral leadership of the professional
and managerial classes and of professors and literati who helped to
shape the bounds of conventional wisdom. Moreover, this cultural
change was a messy business: there are often many contradictory
strands, aspects from older cultures, and potentially revolutionary
slivers. 78 The hegemony of this dominant new culture is never final.
This approach underlines the struggle at the cultural level of
whose vision of social reality would be made to stick and the idea
that cultural dominance or hegemony was achieved by "winning the
active consent"79 of those classes subordinated within the culture. In
the work of Althusser, a systematic development of this concept of
hegemony may be found 8 0 Althusser argues that the modern
capitalist society is composed of a large number of ideological state
apparatuses, including the educational, communications, cultural,
legal, and political. These institutions, existing in the "public" and

76 Some of the problems of critical theory are explored by Stanley Fish, supra, note 74.

77 Supra, note 65 at 279.
78 See R. Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory" in R. Williams,
ed., Problems in Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980) 31 and TJ. Lears, "From
Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer
Culture, 1880-1930" in The Culture of Conswnption, supra, note 65 at 1.
79 See Hall, supra, note 68 at 85.
80 See "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)"
in L Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London:
1971) 121 at 127.
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"private" sectors, all contribute in different ways to the reproduction
of capitalist relations of exploitation.
They achieve this by
recruiting, transforming, and constituting individuals into appropriate
ideological subjects. We automatically recognize ourselves as
consumers or sexual subjects within these ideologies. By continuing
to constitute ourselves in this ideological manner, we reproduce
dominant ideology.
Judith Williamson's studies of advertising draw on Althusser;
they are an imaginative application of the role of advertising as part
of an ideological apparatus and the role of the individual subject in
producing and reproducing meaning. Her focus is on the process
of meaning: how the form of advertising works. Thus, advertisements generally work by transferring meaning (signs) from existing
ideological systems to a product. For example, a picture of
Catherine Deneuve beside Chanel No 5 perfume invites an
individual to see the product in terms of glamour and beauty, thus
substituting the product for both Catherine Deneuve and what she
signifies. Distinctions in social mythologies are used to create
distinctions between products! 1
A central point is that knowledge of these connections is not
intrinsic to the ad. We actively construct that meaning through our
reading of the advertisement.
An important aspect of the
construction of the advertising text is the attempt to position the
reader/subject to read it from a particular viewpoint. This is
reflected in the idea that advertisements leave a space for us to fill
up as subjects. That space in which we constitute ourselves as
subjects of the ads is, it is argued, that of the dominant ideology:
"we are consumers, that we have certain values, that we will freely
buy things, consume, on the basis of these values."82 In this respect,
advertisements are not simply selling products, they are providing us
with a structure in which we construct ourselves. Thus, "in providing
us with a structure in which we, and those goods, are interchangeable, they are selling us ourselves."83

81 See DecodingAdvertisements, supra, note 65 at 27.

82 ibid. at 42.
83 ibmid. at 13.
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We actively reproduce dominant ideology. In Williamson's
view, this process does the ideological work of obscuring the real
structure of society and the nature of social relations. Identifying
ourselves with what we consume creates "the false assumption that
workers 'with two cars and a colour TV' are not part of the working
class."84 Although Williamson believes that advertisements appropriate real needs and desires in people, which if they were not
diverted "could radically change society,"85 and that they give us a
false sense of ourselves, advertising is in her view almost completely
uncontrollable. Whatever restrictions are put on verbal content or
false claims, there is little prospect of controlling the use of images
and symbols. Thus, it can absorb any criticism by incorporating
critical symbols, such as feminism or even revolutionary slogans,
transferring them devoid of their critical content to the product.
Williamson seems, therefore, to reach a result not dissimilar
to that of the Frankfurt School, neglecting Gramsci's comments on
the potential class struggles around the ideological construction of
the individual as consumer.8 6 The media and advertising contribute
to the containment of subversive and oppositional tendencies in
society. There seems little role for agency in this structuralist vision.
Later work in cultural studies challenges this approach,
suggesting a greater power for the reader/audience in the "struggle
for meaning." Cultural meanings are a site for a continuing struggle
between producers and consumers. Fiske,8 7 drawing on a wide
variety of studies, critiques the power of television to construct 8 a8
particular reading by audiences. For example, he points to Morley
who showed how different groups and individuals in decoding TV
messages did not adopt the preferred meaning of a Tv text, but
developed negotiated or oppositional readings. This involves,
therefore, a rejection of a simple transmitter/receiver theory of
84

lIbid.

85 Ibid. at 15.
86 This point is made by Fiske in Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 40.
87 Ibid.
88 D. Morley, Family Television:

Comedia, 1986).

Cultural Power and Domestic Leisure (London:
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communication and the passive image of the consumer in early
theories of consumer exploitation. 9 Individuals and groups may
subvert the text to their own end. For example, Hodge and Tripp
found that children used the programme Prisoner: Cell Block H as
a metaphor for their experience at school. It therefore became a
focus for articulating and understanding their sense of powerlessness 90 Children were not passive receptors but rather "engaged in
a constant active struggle to make sense out of their own social
experience."91 Other studies indicate the complexities of the way in
which television interacts with the politics of the family, social
position, and oral cultures.92 These studies do not deny the
structural conditions of class, gender, and race which might affect
interpretation of the text.

They do, however, challenge both the

idea that these factors mechanically produce meanings in the
particular subject and the homogenous mass consumption image of
the populace implicit in some earlier work.93
Other work undermines the elite/mass culture dichotomy
implicit in earlier theory. Bourdieu shows the connection between
culture and class, that is, the role of "cultural capital" in identifying

89 Fiske, in Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 65, points out how Morley's ethnographic
work can be linked to the semiotic studies of Umberto Eco. Eco's theory of "aberrant coding'
posits that "whenever there are significant social differences between the encoders and
decoders of a text, the decoding will necessarily be 'aberrant."' Fiske cites U. Eco, 'Towards
A Semiotic Inquiry into the TV Message" in J.Corner & J.Hawthorn, eds, Communication
Studies: An IntroductoryReader (London: Edward Arnold, 1980) 131.
90 B. Hodge & D. Tripp, Children and Television: A Semiotic Approach (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1986).
91 Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 68.
92 Ibid., c. 5.
93 A good critique of the "homogenous mass consumption" image is provided by J. Root
in Open the Box (London: Comedia, 1986). The need for television to. appeal to a wide
group of individuals in society with differing interests requires a certain openness of text which
allows for differences of readings. Thus, the series Dallas, perhaps the symbol of "mass
American culture," is read very differently by differing groups. See I. Ang,Watching Dallas:
Soap Opera and Melodramatic Imagination (London: Methuen, 1985) and E. Katz & T.
Liebes, "Mutual Aid in the Decoding of Dallas: Preliminary Notes from a Cross-Cultural
Study" in P. Drummond & R. Paterson, eds, Television in Transition: PapersFrom The First
InternationalTelevision Studies Conference (London: British Film Institute, 1986) 187, cited
in Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 79.
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class interests. 94 Thus, we might assume that the ability to
appreciate certain forms of music or to acquire culture is
attributable to natural taste. Culture is equally available to all, but
only a few have "taste," appreciate the opera, and so on. If,
however, we reject the notion of objective truth in art and culture
and accept that conceptions of culture are historically contingent,
then it becomes a small step to viewing culture as helping to solidify
economic class positions. The denigration of popular and working
class culture may be part of a process of cultural reproduction which
helps to reproduce social and economic inequalities. Schooling plays
an important role in this process and critical educational theory has
shown the regulative role of language and children's texts in
promoting class distinctions and silencing alternative voices. 95
The cumulative impact of these differing strands is that we
should take the popular economy seriously, both as a source of
meaning and a site for struggle. The people are not "cultural dopes"
incapable96 of discrimination and at the mercy of the barons of
industry.
The recent work in cultural studies has, therefore, a humane
and almost upbeat tone, promising the possibility of the empowered
subject/consumer and the spinning of oppositional discourse out of
the cloth of capitalism.9 7 This work is, however, vague on the
94 Bourdieu notes that "a class is defined as much by its being-perceived as by its being,
by its consumption - which need not be conspicuous in order to be symbolic - as much as
by its position in the relations of production (even if it is true that the latter governs the
former)." See Bourdieu, supra, note 65 at 483.
95 See M. Sola & AT. Bennett, 'The Struggle for Voice: Narrative, Literacy and
Consciousness in an East Harlem School" (1985) 167:1 3. Educ. 88; P. Freire, Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, trans. M.B. Ramos (New York: Herder, 1970) and P. Freire, Educationfor Critical
Consciousness (New York: Seabury Press, 1976).
96 Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 309, 313.
97

For example, the punk movement in England constructed an oppositional identity out
of the popular economy. Similarly, Hebdige has shown how the products of the American
cultural industries were used by working class youths in England in the 1950s to develop an
identity in opposition to the anodyne characterization of popular culture on the B.B.C. and
the traditional romantic cloth cap image of the working class. See D. Hebdige, Hiding in the
Light (London: Comedia, 1989).
. Myers, in Understains (London: Comedia, 1986), discusses how the left wing
Greater London Council (G.LC.) in the U.K. used advertising in its anti-abolition campaign
against the Thatcher government. According to an advertising industry study, the G.L.C.
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extent to which subordinate groups have significantly changed their
position through such cultural resistance, its general role in bringing
about social change, and its relationship to changes in the conditions
of social existence. "The people" is a rather vague description which
almost seems to reintroduce the elite/mass culture distinction and
obscure issues of class, gender, and race.
Undoubtedly, control of the discursive production of
meanings is an important form of social and cultural power. The
experience of the feminist movement is often appealed to as an
example of the importance of the struggle over meaning. There
remains the problem, however, of relating these cultural movements
to changes in material conditions. Critics have scoffed at "left-wing
academics ... picking out strands of subversion in every piece of pop

culture from Street Style to Soap Opera."98
pointedly remarks:

As Williamson

Wearing a Lacoste sweatshirt doesn't make anyone middle class any more than
wearing legwarmers makes you a feminist. The idea that ideologies - including

campaign was one of the most "significant campaigns in British advertising history." It set
the agenda for media coverage and shifted public opinion, creating a climate in which the
legislation was overturned. "he widely acknowledged effectiveness of the campaign has
undoubtedly given further impetus to the fast-growing corporate advertising sector" and "has
actually extended perceptions of the power and influence of advertising itself - in particular
in its ability to influence other media." See D. Robb, 'The GLC's Anti 'Paving Bill'
Campaign: Advancing the Science of Political Issue Advertising" in C. Channon, ed., Twenty
Advertising Case Histories (London: Cassell Educational, 1989) 120 at 128-29.
This approach is related to the current search in critical legal work for
"transformative spins," taking elements of the dominant legal culture and using them for a
group's own oppositional or subversive interest. It is similar to Foucault's "resistive power,"
where pleasure is achieved through "exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies,
searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the pleasure that kindles at
having to evade this power, flee from it, foil it or travesty it." See M. Foucault, The History
of Sexuality, vol. 1, trans. R. Hurley (New York. Random House, 1978) at 45. Fiske refers
to this process as "excorporation,' that process by which the powerless steal elements of the
dominant culture and use them in their own, often oppositional or subversive, interests." See
Television Culture, supra, note 65 at 315. The implication in this context is that consumption
may be a liberating and subversive activity. For examples of attempts to develop oppositional
discourse in the field of consumption, see P. Graham, "Criticalness, Pragmatics, and Everyday
Life: Consumer Literacy as Critical Practice" in J. Forester, ed., Critical Theory and Public
Life (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1985) 147 and M. de Certeau, The Invention of
Everyday Life, trans. S.F. Rendall (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1984).
98 J. Williamson as quoted in M. Morriss, "Banality in Cultural Studies" (1988) 10:2
Discourse 3 at 3.
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consumer fads - are increasingly 'cut loose' from the economic base has become
more and more fashionable on the academic left at a time when these levels have
perhaps rarely been more obviously connected." 99

Moreover, bell hooks argues that "the politics of style" results in
potentially radical movements being turned into a commodity, into
"fashionable speech as in 'black women writers are in right now."'100
This potential for commodification and co-optation is always a

danger for any radical challenge to dominant understandings.
These comments remind us of the difficulty of separating
economy from culture, as reflected in the phrase the "culture

industry."10 1 Nowhere is this connection more close than in the
u.sA which dominates the international media and advertising

world.102 Networks sell audiences to advertisers, rather than attempt
to respond to consumer preferences over a period of time. 10 3 They
104

neglect material of interest to the elderly, youth, and the poor.

3. Williamson, "The Politics of Consumption" in . Williamson, Consuming Passions:
The Dynamics of Popular Culture (London: Marion Boyars, 1986) 229 at 233.
100 b. hooks, Talking Back- Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black (Boston:

South End

Press, 1989) at 14.
101 The phrase used by Adorno and Horkheimer, supra, note 70.
102 Nine of the largest ten advertising firms in the world are North American. See A.
Giddens, Sociology (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1989) at 544; B. Bagdikian, The Media
Monopoly, 3d ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990) at ix-xii; M. Raboy, Missed Opportunities:
The Story of Canada'sBroadcastingPolicy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990)
c. 7. Vipond notes that, in 1987, of the 6.8 billion spent on media advertising in Canada,
approximately 50 per cent was spent on the mass media. She notes that "advertising is the
mainstay of our mass media." See M. Vipond, The Mass Media in Canada (Toronto:
Lorimer, 1989) at 89. Magder notes that "advertising not only impinges on the production
practices of media institutions, it is itself an important cultural form." See Magder, supra,
note 7 at 287.
103 For an explanation of the economics of this phenomenon, see R. Babe, Canadian
Television Broadcasting Structure and Performance and Regulation: A Study Prepared For
Economic Council of Canada (Hull, Que.: Canadian Government Publishing, 1979) c. 4. See
also D. Smythe, "Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism" (1975) 1:3 Can. 3. Pol.
& Soc. Theory 1.
104 The following comments are based on a study paper commissioned for U.K.,
Committee on Financing the BBC, 'Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC' Cmnd
9824 in Sessional Papers (1985-86) vol. 20, 219. See J.G. Blumler, 'Television in the United
States: Funding Sources and Programming Consequences" in West Yorkshire Media Politics
Group, Research on the Range and Quality ofBroadcastingServices: A Reportfor the Committee
on Financing of the BBC (London: Home Office, 1986) 73. Blumler quotes, at 113, an
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Advertisers, who are entitled to preview programmes for suitability,
disassociate themselves from controversial programming and the net
effect is safe conventional programming.105 Those few shows which
attempt to raise social issues generally convert them into personal
problems to be addressed at the family or individual level and often
contain facile endings. A recent study of broadcasting in the u.sA
notes that these processes operate in a society so committed to the
First Amendment values of free press and expression and concludes,
ironically, that "a society which safeguards the sanctity of
communication from possible invasion by certain political interests
should generate no indignation over equivalent inroads from a
different source. 106 Finally, there is the increasing concentration of
ownership in Canada and the u.sA within interlocking corporate
groups, the social consequences of which are rarely discussed in the
1
media. 07
There is little work on the development of oppositional
discourse out of advertising campaigns. They may be a site for
struggle and cultural resistance, as demonstrated by graffiti
campaigns in London and in u.s. cities against sexist advertising and
attempted exploitation of minority groups08 The message of
cultural studies is perhaps that these struggles over meaning are
potentially important. Students of post-industrial society argue that
the increasing extension of the logic of capitalist relations beyond
the world of work into a multitude of social relations has resulted
in the increasing politicization of these relations. The social
relationships around consumption are, therefore, increasingly sites
for political contests over control of living conditions (as in urban

agency representative as stating that "Beyond 54 most advertisers couldn't care less ...
since
with older people packaged goods consumption goes down."
105 During the 1970s, 30 major ad agencies formed a cooperative company known as
A.I.S. which previews every prime time programme and episode for compatibility with the
advertisers "programme content sensitivities." Blumler, ibid. at 123.
106 ibid. at 125-26.
107 See Bagdakian and Raboy, supra, note 102.
108 See, generally, Myers, supra, note 97.
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movements) and the politics of identity (as in feminism).12 9
Consumption is a contested terrain: a contradictory discourse of
potential liberation and subordination!n °
In summary, there are several insights that may be drawn
from cultural studies. First, we should interrogate closely our

109 Bowles and Gintis argue that, in modem society, "politics is not simply about the
manner in which power adjudicates competing claims for resources. It is also a contest over
who we are to become, a contest in which identity, interests and solidarity are as much the
outcome as the starting point of political activity." See S. Bowles & H. Gintis, Democracy and
Capitalisr Property,Community andthe ContradictionsofModem Social Thought (New York:
Basic Books, 1986) at 8.
110 A useful example of this struggle over consumption is the movement which achieved
the banning of children's advertising in Quebec. See G. Larose, L'Abolition de lapublicit6
aux enfants (M.S.C. Thesis, Universitd de Montrdal, 1973).
For an exploration of these contradictions from a historical perspective, see M.
Nava, "Consumerism and Its Contradictions" (1987) 1 Cultural Studies 204. The left has
traditionally paid little attention to consumption as a site of struggle. However, the growth
of "new social movements" and the search for an alternative to the right wing politics of the
market have led to debates over consumption as a terrain of political struggle and personal
liberation and the role of cultural as well as economic struggle. See E. Laclau & C. Mouffe,
Hegemony and Socialist Strateg: Towards a Radical DemocraticPolitics, trans. W. Moore &
P. Cammack (London: Verso, 1985) at 159. See, for example, S. Hall & M. Jacques, eds,
New Tunes: The ChangingFaceof Politicsin the 1990s (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1989);
F. Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society' in A. Kaplan, ed., Postmodemism and
Its Discontents (London: Verso, 1988) 13; A Sivandan, "All that Melts into Air is Solid: The
Hokum of New Times" (1989-90) 31:3 Race and Class 1. See also Kellner, supra, note 70,
c. 6.
These issues concerning consumption may be related to earlier works heralding a
post-industrial society where individuals are not merely subordinated to capital in the
workplace, but through processes of integration are subordinated in a multitude of other
social relations: culture, free time, education, and sex. See A. Touraine, The Post-Industrial
Society, trans. LFX. Mayhew (New York Random House, 1971). For an interesting study
of the increasing commodification and control of leisure, see J. Seabrook, The Leisure Society
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). In England, there has been traditionally a distrust by the
left of commodified consumption and pleasure. This can be seen in the work of R. Hoggart,
The Uses Of Literacy (Fair Lawn: Essential Books, 1957), where he fears that the consumer
society will break down the working class community. George Orwell, in his essay "Pleasure
Resorts" in S. Orwell & I.Angus, eds, The Collected Essays, Journaliunand Letters of George
Orwell, vol. 4 (New York: Harcourt, 1968) 78, saw consumer culture as a debasing force. The
communist party campaigned against horror comics in the early 1950s, partly on the basis that
they imported U.S. "Coca Cola" values into British traditions. See Hiding in the Light, supra,
note 97, c. 3.
In the U.S.A., Harris and Milkis argue that the ideology of consumption was
problematized in the 30s and the late 60s. See R. Harris & S. Milkis, The Politics of
Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two Agencies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) c.
5. See also the discussion in The Lonely Crowd, supra, note 6 and the perceptive work by
Robert Lynd, 'Democracy's Third Estate: The Consumer" (1936) 51 Pol. Sci. Q.481.
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assumptions about the media, advertising, and their power over the
consumer. We should be sceptical of arguments which suggest that
the media transmits messages to us so that over a period of time we
become saturated with whatever ideology is being peddled.111
Consumers are not "cultural dopes." Second, it suggests a different
way of thinking about issues concerning advertising than is currently
provided by the dichotomy of free choice versus paternalism and the
conception of power in the discourse of contemporary public policy.
This involves the rejection of the idea of the individual as a preexisting unified identity who acts upon the external world. We are
socially situated subjects who are partly a product of social relations
and who can only act through existing linguistic and cultural codes.
Anthony Giddens's concept of structuration is helpful here in
thinking about questions of structure and agency. He argues that
the image of a constraining structure on individual action does not
capture the way in which social life is continually constituted and
reproduced through individual behavior. Structure is both medium
and outcome.11 2 This does not involve a rejection of agency for
structure or the ability to reflect critically on structural issues, but it
suggests that the debate over advertising is not one of free choice
versus paternalism, but rather what kind of society we should be and
what influences and mouldings we should be exposed to. A
problematic is identifying those situations which may be conducive
to social action which transforms, rather than merely reproduces,
structure. Third, the interrelation of language, culture, and power
is central in thinking about the role of advertising and the media.
This may not be adequately captured by empirical methods or
concentration on the power of advertising in the short term.

ill This exploitation approach often relies on the rhetorical effect of numbers. For
example, Postman argues that "[a]n American who has reached the age of 40 will have seen
well over one million television commercials in his or her lifetime, and has close to another
million to go before the first Social Security check arrives. We may safely assume, therefore,
that the television commercial has profoundly influenced American habits of thought." See
supra, note 10 at 126.
112 A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Introduction of The Theory of Structuration

(Berkeley- University of California Press, 1984) at 25. For a discussion of structuration
theory in the context of freedom of speech, see M. Crawford, "Regimes of Tolerance: A
Communitarian Approach to Freedom of Expression and Its Limits" (1990) 48 U.T. Fac. L.
Rev. 1.

1991]

A Critique

Attention to the significance of advertising in the cultural economy
is therefore as important as its role in the financial economy.
Finally, we should not see advertising in isolation from other cultural
phenomena. At the very least, we should connect the different ways
in which discourse about advertising connects through what
Althusser describes as differing ideological state apparatuses, such as
law, education, and the media.
IV. LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY DISCOURSE AND
ADVERTISING:
THE PULL OF THE POLICY
113
AUDIENCE
Governments, in western capitalist economies, generally focus
on regulating the economic rather than cultural aspects of
advertising. They rarely proceed beyond deception and information
l14
failure as bases for regulating the content of advertising messages
Public policy primarily attempts to provide the conditions for
rational choice in the market through enhancing information and
the education of consumers. Liberation for the consumer will be
achieved by being armed against the insinuations of modern
advertising. The cultural issues surrounding advertisements have
115
not been discussed at great length in policy documents.
Arguments that advertising is unfair, that it results in psychological
exploitation or inappropriate social values, have infrequently resulted
in significant legal regulation. Any regulation that has been

113 Silbey & Sarat, supra, note 17.
114 In Canada, this is the thrust of the relevant sections of the CompetitionAct , R.S.C.
1985, c.34, the relevant sections of the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27, the Teaile
LabellingAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-10, and the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. 38. See House of Commons, Report of the Standing Committee on Consumer and
CorporateAffairs On The Subject of MisleadingAdvertising (Ottawa: The Committee, 1988).
115 It is fair perhaps to add the caveat that, in Canada, there has been a continuing
undercurrent of concern on this issue. The debate has been framed around issues of national
cultural identity being pitted against American commercialism. See, for example, the 1974
CRTC hearings on the CBC, Radio FrequenciesAre Public Property (1974), Decisions, CRTC
74-70.
The issue of sex role stereotyping has, of course, been a continuing topic in
broadcasting policy making. The debate has not, however, generally been underpinned by
much theoretical reflection on the cultural issues around advertising.
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116
attempted has generally been through self-regulatory approaches,
although the rationale for this particular style of regulation is often
unconvincing. In addition, sophisticated arguments concerning the
cultural impact of advertising have rarely made their way into public
policy discourse.
The preference manipulation approach did, however,
influence some judicial, academic, and policy texts of the late '60s
and early '70s.!17 Consumers were conceived as relatively passive
victims of the manipulative power of producers, with little
comparative advantage in protecting their interests 1 8 The moral
discourse of exploitation is reflected in the Ontario Law Reform
Commission's rejection of the puffing defence as "based on a
misconception of the importance of modern advertising techniques
in influencing the consumer's buying decisions."119 Arguments for
the extension of producer liability to the ultimate consumer also
seem connected to assumptions about the power of manufacturers'
advertising to affect consumer purchasing decisions. Priest argues

116 In Canada, for example, see the discussion in J3J. Boddewyn, "Outside Participation
in Canadian Advertising Self-Regulation" (1984) 1 Can. J. Admin. Sci. 215. In the UK, see
Ramsay, supra, note 14 at 388.
117 For an outline of U.S. sources, see Rice, supra, note 54, c. 17-19. The work of
Galbraith, supra, note 46 was probably the most influential during this period. Pierre Juneau,
Chair of the CRTC at this time, claims to have been influenced by Galbraith's writings
(Interview, June 1990, transcript on file with author). Galbraith's work is discussed at some
length by M. Trebilcock in "Consumer Protection in the Affluent Society" (1970) 16 McGill
L.J. 263. Several Canadian decisions of the late 60s and early 70s which seemed to adopt
an aggressive consumerist stance towards misleading advertising are set out in M. Trebilcock
et al, A Study on Consumer Misleading and Unfair Trade Practices (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1976): Quaker Oats Co. of CanadaLtd v. Kitzul (1965), [1966] 53 D.L.R. (2d) 630
(Sask. Q.B.); Ranger v. HerbertA Watts (Quebec) Ltd, (1970] 10 D.L.R. (3d) 395 (Ont. H.C.)
[hereinafter Ranger] and R v. ImperialTobacco ProductsLtd, [1971] 5 W.W.R. 409 (Alta. S.C.
AD.).
118 Thus, Haines J. commented in Ranger, supra, note 117 at 405: "By newspaper, radio
and television every home has become the display window of the manufacturer, and the stand
of every pitchman. By extraordinary skill the printed and spoken word together with the
accompanying art form and drama have become an alluring and attractive means of
representation of quality and confidence."
119 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Consumer Warranties and Guarantees
in the Sale of Goods (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney-General, 1972) at 29.
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that similar sentiments dominated thinking about producers' use120of
standard form warranty provisions to limit liability to consumers.
If legal academics at this time recognized the broader
questions of the social and ethical issues raised by the techniques
of modem advertising in moulding consumer preferences,1 21 there
was a remarkable similarity to economists in their response to the
issues of preference manipulation. In their view, it was necessary to
transform the moral issue of exploitation into the social science
discourse of measuring the effects of advertising. Posed in this
manner, the issue of the regulation of image appeals was fraught
with difficulties given the absence of detailed empirical research on
the impact of these claims, the lack of a social consensus on what
constituted manipulation, and the fear that such regulation would be
"tainted by an undesirable degree of paternalism. ' 122 To the extent
that unfair advertising came within the regulatory umbrella, it should
only be in those situations where there was a measurable economic
loss to consumers (for example, in artificial product differentiation)
or a clearly demonstrated emotional exploitation. A major policy
document concluded by noting that "the case for regulating
advertising on purely social grounds is a shaky one, for it rests 123
on
individual preconceptions of desirable social and aesthetic values."
In this policy scenario, the conception of advertising's power
focuses on the ability of advertising to measurably affect consumers'
observable behaviour in the short term. Their work seems based
on a distinction between the domain of policy, where questions are
amenable to scientific analysis, and the world of politics, value
judgments, and irrational polemic. An important policy role is,
therefore, to submit the rhetoric of popular works, such as The
1 24 to empirical analysis. The "speculation and
Hidden Persuaders,

120 See G. Priest, "A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty' (1980-81) 90 Yale LJ.

1297 and "The Invention of Enterprise Liability:

A Critical History of the Intellectual

Foundations of Modem Tort Lav' (1985) 14 J.Leg. Stud. 461.

121 See "Consumer Protection in the Affluent Society," supra, note 117.
122

Study on Consumer Misleading and Unfair Trade Practices,supra, note 117 at 25.

123 bmid.
at 30.
124 Supra, note 65.
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dogma" of such texts would be tested "by detailed empirical
research": 125 positivist social science would transcend the ideological
battlefield, separating rhetoric from reality, and resulting in
enlightened policy. This approach towards difficult issues of
advertising regulation was institutionalized in the u.sA in the early
1970s, when market surveys and psychological evidence were
important aspects of such landmark cases as 1TT ContinentalBaking
Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 26 Reading these cases is an
exercise in reading competing social science evidence. The more
difficult the case, the more the battlefield became the expert
evidence from social science studies.
Policy documents and
academic writing continue to advocate the use of greater social
1 27
science expertise in advertising regulation.
The recent importation of the doctrine of commercial
speech by the Supreme Court of Canada requires the law to
construct its vision of the role of advertising in society. It is a view
which endorses the consumption of commodities in the market as
an important aspect of human flourishing. In the Ford decision,
commercial expression is granted constitutional protection by the
Court on two grounds: (1) the broad interpretation given to the
expression formula; and (2) "over and above its intrinsic value as
expression," the role commercial expression plays "in enabling
individuals to make informed economic choices, an important aspect
128
of individual self-fulfilment and personal autonomy."
On this view, advertising is closely linked to both economic
and political values; that is, the efficient functioning of the consumer
market and individual autonomy. Commercial advertising "involves
more than economics."129 The position adopted by the Court seems
close to a classic liberal vision of individual economic activity as an
125 IbMd. at 29.
126 83 F.T.C. 856 (1973), modified and enforced, 532 F. 2d 207 (2d C1irc. 1976).
127 See, for example, House of Commons, supra, note 114; V. Black, "A Brief Word
About Advertising" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 509.
128 Ford v. AG. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, (1989) 54 D.LR. (4th) 577 [hereinafter
Ford cited to D.L.R.] at 618.
129 Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontariov. Rocket, (1990) 71 D.LR. (4th) 68 at
74 (S.C.C.), McLachlin J.
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area central to an individual's self-definition; consequently, it is most
in need of protection against encroachment by the collectivity./ 30 It
is the liberatory vision of consumerism. This transformation of a
particular ideology of market/state relations into a constitutional
right is troubling to many commentators who argue that it is not the
to endorse in this manner a particular form of
role of a liberal1 3state
1
social relations.
The incoherence of the reasoning of the Court is illustrated
most clearly in its conceptualization of the values at stake in
determining the extent to which commercial speech and the
consumer will be protected. In the view of the Court, this issue
"reveals the tension between two values: the value of the free
circulation of commercial information and the value of consumer
protection against harmful commercial speech."132 Here is the
implied contrast between the "free" natural state of the private
market and the public intervention to prevent harm. The rationale
for regulation is to improve the quality of market information. But
this rationale appears to present a paradox, since both constitutional
protection of commercial speech and government "intervention" are
based on considerations of consumer information. In the former
case, the argument is based not solely on economic welfare but on
a consumer's right to receive information 33 The content of this
130 See P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117 at 131.
For a classic statement of this position in modem times, see M. Friedman, Capitalism and
Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962). This approach is made forcefully by
Cory JA in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental

Surgeons, infra, note 133.
131 The accusation of "Lochnering," imposing a particular vision of market state relations,
was made by Rehnquist 3. in his dissent in aiginia State Boardof Pharmacyv. Vuginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 at 784 (1976): "While there is again much to be said for the
Court's observation as a matter of desirable public policy, there is certainly nothing in the
United States Constitution which requires the Virginia Legislature to hew to the teachings of
Adam Smith in its legislative decisions regulating the pharmacy profession." See discussion
in A.C. Hutchinson, "Money Talk. Against Constitutionalizing (Commerical) Speech" [1990]
1 Can. Bus. LJ. 1.
132 Ford, supra, note 128 at 612.
133 See, for example, the decision of Cory JA in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision
in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (1980), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 641 at 664:
"The consumer has a right to as much helpful information about the products offered as he
or she can get ...
The right of the consumer to receive information is important in today's
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right, whether or not understood in a Hohfeldian sense, is equated
with the level of information that would be provided in a "free
market." This is a terrain where, speaking metaphorically, the river
of information flows freely. But all consumers may not be aware of
the eddies and rapids, so there is a need to intervene, perhaps to
the frustration of those more knowledgeable or willing to take risks.
But this metaphorical contrast between a free and a
controlled flow is deeply misleading. There is no natural level of
market information which can be determined apart from difficult
normative questions about the ground rules of market exchange.
Requirements of truth in lending, the common law rules on
misrepresentation and mistake, implied warranties, occupational
licensing, weights and measures standards, and the duty to warn in
negligence are all addressed to issues of information regulation.
None is obviously a natural requirement of a free market. The very
existence of advertising points to a failure in the perfect information
assumption of the market model. So which measures should be
characterized as interventions rather than ground rules? Which
should be accorded constitutional protection on the basis of the
listener's rights to information? If consumption is a potentially
important area of self-fulfilment, then should we recognize a
constitutional right to complete information from sellers, so that
individuals may decide whether or not to consume? 134
The argument from welfare is likely to be as inconclusive as
the rights argument. Reflection suggests that the issues here are
not primarily economic or distributive, but rather are about what
sort of society we should be. Even the literature on preference
manipulation indicates that consumption in modem societies is not
a solitary event. If the Court did intend that its protection of
advertising should endorse and facilitate the purchase of
commodities as a form of human flourishing, then perhaps it should
have reflected on how it knew that this particular market form
facilitates human flourishing.

society. Indeed, from the point of view of social equity and fairness, it may be more
important that the right of the listener to receive information be protected than the right of
the advertiser to express it."
134 See A.Leff, 'The Pontiac Prospectus" (1974) 2 Consumer J.25.
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It is instructive to contrast this case with the celebrated and
influential u.s. case of Charles of the Ritz DistributorsCorporationv.
Federal Trade Commission.135 This 1944 landmark case is often
taken to stand for the proposition that protection against misleading
advertising will be extended to protect the credulous as well as the
reasonable consumer. From 1934 to 1939, Charles of the Ritz had
marketed a cream known as "Rejuvenescence," representing that it
gave the skin a 'Wonderfully rejuvenating' bloom. Over $1,000,0000
The
in sales of the cream were made during this period.
Commission charged the company with making false representations,
since no cosmetic could overcome the skin's aging process. The
Circuit Court rejected the company's defence that no straight
thinking person could believe that its cream could actually
rejuvenate. This standard interpretation of protection for the
gullible consumer is reflected in Clark J.'s comment that
while the wise and the worldly may well realize the falsity of any representations
that the present product can roll back the years, there remains 'that vast multitude'
the
of others who like Ponce de Leon, still seek a perpetual fountain of youth ...
average woman, conditioned by talk in the magazines and over the radio of
to mean
'vitamins, hormones, and God knows what,'
13 6 might take 'rejuvenescence'
that this 'is one of the modern miracles'.

There are at least two stories here. Clark J.'s judgment may
reflect a heavily gendered paternalism: the dark side of paternalism.
We protect women consumers because they are unable to protect
themselves against the power of business. Their rationality has been
undermined and they are no longer capable of making fully
autonomous decisions. If only they had better education or more
information, things might have turned out differently. Just as we
protect children against the consequences of their actions, as in
Invin Toy,13 7 so we protect women in the type of situation in
Charles of The Ritz. Yet, this construction of the consumer as
incapable, as prisoner to consumption addictions, is from another
perspective highly patronising and deeply counter to dominant
ideology in Western society. It is, therefore, simple for conservative
135 143 F. 2d. 676 (1944) [hereinafter Charles of the Ritz].
136 ibmid. at 680.
137 Irwin Toy Ltd v. AG. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
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forces to exploit this sentiment and characterize consumer protection
as the paternalism of an elite group attempting to impose its views
on the populace. Who, after all, really believes that a skin cream
could "roll back the years"? Moreover, in the liberal construction
of consumer protection, there lurks the fear that, if we accept that
people are not "idiots," that they know what they are doing when
they sign the form or read the ad, then the game is up for consumer
protection.
Duncan Kennedy counters this position by arguing that this
form of paternalistic protection should be broadly extended because
we are all "idiots" subject to the false consciousness of modern
capitalism 1 38 It is not the other - the old woman, the poor or
naive individual - who is the victim of consumer fraud, it is
ourselves. The bright lines of capacity and incapacity must be
replaced by a continuum which reflects the fact that "human beings
have limited capacities to understand, to reason and to predict."1 39
The issue in cases like Charles of the Ritz is not about questions of
economic market power, but rather the cultural question of false
consciousness.
But there is little comfort in the camaraderie of idiots. A
second way of reading Clark J.'s comments is, therefore, to see him
recognizing the cultural and structural dimensions of advertising and
the consumer subject as socially situated. The market place here is
dominated by a culture industry which makes it difficult for
individuals to think critically. The culture of science and progress
has been turned into a commodity, such that Charles of the Ritz is
able to sell illusions of youth, personal attractiveness, and control
over one's body as a means of achieving control over one's life.14°
138 See Kennedy, supra, note 40 at 632 quoting R. Clark "The Soundness of Financial
Intermediaries" Q976-77) 86 Yale L.J. I at 19: "Human finitude and normative error are the
major sorts of personal imperfections: human beings have limited capacities to understand,
to reason, and to predict, and they do not always know or choose the risks that under some
moral theory they ought to prefer."
139 Ibid.
140 Control of the body is an important topic in discussions of the development of the

consumer society. Zygmunt Bauman, drawing on the work of Foucault sees a connection
between consumer health fads, jogging and so on and the need for reproduction of more
disciplined workers and consumers. See "Industrialism, Consumerism and Power" (1983) 1:3
Theory, Culture and Society 32.
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We should recognize more fully the different cultural story
about consumers in the above account. Within this story, consumers
are not dopes or idiots. We do develop strategies for dealing with
powerful institutions, but we do so within a larger set of material
and ideological structures and codes that are not of our choosing.
Given the importance of these social structures and cultural
institutions, such as advertising, in constituting our subjectivity and
the role of everyday practices in reproducing dominant culture, they
should be the focus for political debate. At the least, scholars might
probe the way in which regulation of advertising is related to the
ability of individuals to think reflectively about the everyday acts by
which we reproduce the consumer culture.
In Canada, law's truth knows little of this cultural approach.
The dominant discourse in relation to consumer protection reflects
approaches rooted in philosophical and methodological individualism,
in particular, economics and positivistic social science. The general
area of cultural studies has had little input into the policy process.
It is at this point that the relationship of knowledge to
power may be made more explicit. Much of the work on advertising
in law and public policy is dominated by "the pull of the policy
audience."141 This has several consequences. The academic, as
expert policy adviser, attains authority by speaking in a discourse
that appears to be relatively apolitical. By avoiding discussions
about ends or attempting to draw on weak value judgments, policy
analysis attempts to separate technical policy issues from the bigger
questions of politics. The language of positivistic social science
provides the appearance of detached authoritative advice.
Bureaucrats, whose claim to power also may rest on the concept of
detached, neutral, and dispassionate advice, will be attracted by this
approach. These two groups of academics and administrators are
linked by a common class pretension to power based on the
apolitical scientific knowledge necessary to manage a complex
economy. In English Canada, the domination of neo-classical
economics in the Canadian policy process has resulted in academics
playing the role of policy critic rather than social critic.142 There
141 See Silbey & Sarat, supra, note 17.
142 See Brooks & Gagnon, supra, note 63 at 126.
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was also the general influence during the 1960s and 1970s of
positivistic and behavioral approaches to social science and to the
role of law in society. Work described as cultural studies could be
downplayed as "dogma and speculation," only to be taken seriously
if formulated as hypotheses which could be falsified by empirical
data. Power was only meaningful as a concept if it could be
translated into a measurable impact.1 43
In the conception of the audience as policy maker, the
bottom line of many studies was what, in instrumental terms, the
state might do to address issues of advertising regulation. Social
change was associated with enlightened policy making by the state
through a variety of policy instruments. Since it was often not clear
from cultural studies what, if anything, could be done about
advertising in terms of policy making, rather than political action,
little enthusiasm was shown for these analyses and their practitioners
could be described as ideologues and polemicists.
V. CONCLUSION
It's like a revival, with public testimonies. There's so much thought going
into what people do with their votes in this election. It's as if politics
has become an aspect of life as fraught as, say, shopping - absorbing
time, full of hard, obscure, silly, weighty choices 4

Thinking critically about advertising leads quickly into
reflection on issues of economic and cultural power in modern
societies. Advertising is a central aspect of the consumer marketplace, financing media communication and representing a significant
economic and cultural industry. The mixture of economy and
culture in the phrase the "culture industry" reminds us of the
difficulty of separating these two spheres. The economic structure
of the international media industry, dominated by the u.s., and the
economic imperatives of securing audiences for advertisers place

143 This was, of course, the approach of law and economics to such issues as inequality
of bargaining power in contract law. For a good example of this strategy, see Priest, supra,
note 120.
144 R. Salutin, Waiting for Democracy:
1989) at 203.
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significant barriers to the development of oppositional discourse 45
In addition, the literature on post-industrial society points to the
increasing penetration of the logic of commodity capitalism into all
aspects of social life, including the so called private arena of leisure,
culture, and sexual relations.
It is also quite clear, however, from the development of new
social movements organised around consumption that the consumer
society has not led to the end of ideology and that advertising may
be a site for social struggle. A common aspect of consumer culture,
reflected in advertising, is the appeal to images of cultural
democratization and equality, images which may act as catalysts for
the rejection of inequalities in social and economic relations.
Advertising may be an opportunity for social struggle and for
highlighting inequalities and oppressive social and economic relations
associated with consumption. But it is important to maintain a focus
on the wider relationships around consumption and to be aware of
advertising's power to commodify any new, more progressive, image.
The ability of advertising to adjust to new images of women,
substituting the successful lawyer for the happy homemaker, is an
obvious example of cooptive commodification which should not
conceal the continuing class, gender, and race inequalities in social
relations.
We also need to problematize the role of law and the central
state in the regulation of advertising. It must be asked to what
extent policies in this area have acted in tandem with other forces
in the normalization of a particular vision of consumer relations.
Since at least the end of the Second World War, the central state
in North America and Western Europe has tended to identify its
consumer policies with market consumerism. It was an approach,
which during this period, meshed well with broader state economic
objectives of dismantling wartime controls and promoting full
Vigorous policing of
employment and competitive markets.
misleading advertising claims is consistent with these objectives.
Consumer policy as an instrument of social integration and control
is illustrated in the work of many a ministry of consumer affairs,
145 For a useful discussion of the potential for oppositional discourse, see L. Bean,

"White Noise: The Long, Sad Story of TV Criticism" in The Vlldage Voice Literay Supplement
(December 1990) at 14.
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some consumer advocacy organizations, and consumer education
programmes in school. These attempt to both substitute expert
knowledge for local knowledge and to communicate the "proper"
norms of market behavior, extending administrative control over
consumer action.1 46 It has never been completely successful in
subordinating individuals to this mode of living.
Although
consumerism, as reflected in consumer reports and mainstream
consumer organizations, has never challenged seriously the
assumptions of this discourse, there has always been a part of
consumerism which has seen consumption as an important terrain
for political struggle against the domination by an oppressive form
of life. Feminism, the ecological movement, and the social
movements concerned with the control of urban space are three
examples of attempts to develop counter discourses.
We clearly need further study of those moments, such as the
late 60s and early 70s, when critiques of advertising were associated
with movements for social transformation. My speculation is,
however, that the use of social science evidence and expert agencies
to address these questions of taste construction and transfer
contributed ultimately to the subsequent regulatory cul de sac.
Lacking popular political legitimacy, agencies were required
ultimately to stake their claim for regulation on scientific knowledge,
transforming the politics of advertising into technical questions. But
the constitution of the consumer market is a central political
question raising questions whose resolution is likely to have a large
patterning effect on economic and social relations and which are illsuited to decisions by experts. The regulation of advertising is also
closely related to work from a variety of perspectives which searches
for a better form of democratic politics. 47 Indeed, it is the
treatment of politics, as a commodifed market form harnessing the
skills of marketing and advertising, which has prompted much of this
work. It is imperative to foster greater public discussion of the
impact of the economics of the media and its ownership.1 48 A
146 See sources cited supra, note 97.
147 See the discussion in Critical Theory and Public Life, supra, note 97 and Hutchinson,
supra, note 131 at 31-34.
148 See Raboy & Bagdakian, supra, note 102.
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modest policy might be to take liberal rhetoric seriously and require
licensees to reserve time for counter advertising for any 1product
49
claims which raise controversial issues of public importance.
I have suggested how a study of the role of advertising in
taste construction and transfer undermines the traditional distinction
between the private and public realm and the construction of
regulation as intervention in the prepolitical private sphere of the
market. We should take seriously the arguments of writers, such as
Giddens, that, in our continuing acts of routine consumption, we are
helping to reproduce the social institutions that we played no part
in bringing into existence 50 At the least, this suggests a greater
focus on the politics of the everyday world of consumption and their
connection to the broader institutions of contemporary society. As
Tomlinson suggests, "[T]he relation between our everyday pleasures
and the politics of the age is a binding concern. '15 Any attempt to
develop a critical theory of the consumer society must take these
issues seriously.

149 Nelson, supra, note 9 at 134 makes the comment that "as environmental issues
increasingly becomes 'matters of public concern' ... virtually every product ad on mainstream
radio and TV should be followed by a counter-ad pointing out the product's health and

environmental dangers in order to achieve 'balance'." For a useful discussion of the fairness
doctrine in the context of regulation of advertising, see S. Breyer & R. Stewart, eds,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, 2d ed. (Toronto: Little Brown, 1985) at 985-1001.
See the interesting proposals in Raboy, supra, note 102 at 342-57.
150 See A. Giddens, "What do sociologists do?" in A. Giddens, ed., Social Theory and
Modem Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) c. 1.

151 A. Tomlinson, "Introduction: Consumer Culture and the Aura of the Commodity"
in A. Tomlinson, ed., Consumption, Identity, and Style (London: Routledge, 1990) 1 at 35.

